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According to recent research, abnormal behavior appears normal to the extent it is 
understood. Cultural differences in frameworks for making sense of abnormality suggest 
there may be variations in this ‘reasoning fallacy’. In light of evidence that people from 
Western cultures psychologize abnormality to a greater extent than people from East 
Asian cultures, the effect of understanding on perceptions of abnormality was predicted 
to differ across cultures. Results of a cross-cultural questionnaire study indicated that 
understanding made behavior seem normal to European Australians (n=51), consistent 
with the reasoning fallacy. For Singaporeans (n=51), however, understanding did not 
influence the extent to which behavior was normalized, and made abnormal behavior 
more stigmatizing. Cultural variations in the effect of understanding were attributed to 
the differential salience of deviance frameworks, which are grounded in culturally 













Recent research suggests that abnormal behavior is perceived as normal to the 
extent people find it easy to understand. In a now famous paper, Paul Meehl (1973) 
claimed that this type of thinking can be found among clinical psychologists. By way of 
illustration, Meehl told the story of T. Eugene Thompson, a man who murdered his wife 
for a million dollars in life insurance. According to Meehl, Thompson’s psychologist 
argued, “I suppose if I knew enough about T. Eugene Thompson, like the way his wife 
sometimes talked to him at breakfast, I would understand why he did it” (p.244). 
According to Meehl, these comments imply that if T. Eugene Thompson’s wife were 
“sometimes grumpy in the mornings…he would have been entitled to kill her” (p.244). 
Sanctioning deviant behavior on account of perceived insight into the psychological 
make-up of a deviant individual constitutes what Meehl terms a ‘reasoning fallacy’.  
 Subsequent research by Ahn, Novick, and Kim (2003) demonstrates that this 
effect applies to clinicians and lay people alike. In a series of studies, their research 
showed that a person described with a checklist of symptoms (e.g., “Penny frequently 
suffers from insomnia. She also has trouble remembering the names of objects”) is seen 
as more abnormal than a person described with the same checklist where the symptoms 
are linked with a clear causal narrative (e.g., “because Penny frequently suffers from 
insomnia and is in a habitual state of sleep deprivation, she has trouble remembering the 
names of objects”). 
 Concepts of normality 
 Whereas Meehl highlights the effect of understanding on perceptions of what 




understanding on perceptions of prevalence. Judgments of prevalence and moral 
acceptability can both be seen as normality judgments. With regard to perceptions of 
prevalence, there is in fact a great deal of evidence to support the notion that explaining 
behavior will make it seem normal. For instance, the explanation effect in probability 
judgments demonstrates that the perception of what is likely to occur (e.g., the likelihood 
of a football team winning a game) is biased by the degree to which the hypothetical 
future outcome (e.g., the team’s victory) has been explained or imagined (Sherman, 
Zehner, Johnson, & Hirt, 1983). Similarly, according to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
simulation heuristic (1982) an uncertain outcome’s likelihood is judged by the ease with 
which a scenario leading to it can be mentally simulated. Given that biased interpretations 
and selective attention to facts facilitate the ease with which behavior can be mentally 
simulated, ease of explanation and perceived prevalence are, in reality, unrelated. Thus 
the understanding-makes-it-normal phenomenon constitutes a reasoning fallacy.   
 Why does this phenomenon occur, and does understanding always have this 
effect? According to Meehl, behavior is normalized to the extent people see it as 
“dynamically understandable” (p. 20). By implication, understanding makes behavior 
seem normal when the perceiver experiences insight into the mental life of the deviant 
individual. The phenomenon would therefore seem to depend on a folk psychological 
explanatory style. When Ahn and colleagues liken the effect to the simulation heuristic, 
they too attribute the effect to folk psychological understanding processes. According to 
both accounts, the perceiver invokes belief/desire psychology – mentally simulating 
beliefs, desires, and intentions of the deviant individual – in order to make sense of their 




cultures will be most susceptible to the ‘reasoning fallacy’. Research in social psychiatry 
shows that psychological understandings of deviance may be somewhat unique to this 
cultural setting (Kirmayer, 1988; Schmelkin, Wachtel, Schneiderman, & Hecht, 1988). 
 
Psychological and socio-moral idioms of distress 
There is a great deal of evidence that shows cultural differences in behavioral 
explanations offered by people from Western European and East Asian cultures. 
According to this research, people from collectivist cultures tend to rate external qualities 
as most defining of a person (e.g., handsome, polished, healthy) whereas members of 
individualist cultures tend to rate internal traits as most defining (e.g., dominant, 
distrustful, unscrupulous) (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). Just as there is cultural 
variation in the way normal, everyday behavior is explained, research in cultural 
psychiatry shows corresponding differences in explanations of abnormality. . 
  In Western cultures, mental illness is framed though a psychological ‘idiom of 
distress’, reflected in the prevalence of dynamically-oriented therapeutic strategies where  
patients are encouraged to express distress with reference to internal mood states, 
conflicts, and desires. According to Kirmayer (1988), this form of expression involves 
explicit references to theories of mind, self and emotion and presumes “autonomy, 
individuality, self-reflexivity, expressiveness and a private rhetoric of motives” (p.330). 
Within this idiom of distress abnormality is seen as psychological dysfunction and 
individual irrationality. If irrationality is the basis on which behavior is judged to be 




understanding of the core conflicts and desires producing it may be a means by which 
order is restored to disorder.  
Whereas the psychological idiom is favored in the Western cultural setting, 
extensive ethnographic evidence shows that people from East Asian cultures tend to 
frame mental disorder through socio-moral or somatic distress idioms (Kirmayer, 1989; 
Ryder et al., 2008). Through a socio-moral idiom, distress is perceived as the individual 
manifestation of larger social unrest. As the concept of the person in East Asian cultures 
subordinates the individual to the larger whole (Chu, 1985; Smith, 1983), individual 
distress is perceived as the expression of changing social conditions such as the erosion 
of traditional values that modernization brings (Kirmayer, 1989, p. 331).  
Through a “somatic” idiom, the bodily expression of distress becomes the focus 
of complaint (e.g., Kirmayer, 1989; Kleinman & Good, 1985; Ryder et al., 2008). In a 
cultural context where social concerns are prioritized over individual needs, bodily 
expression of distress may provide an outlet for socially undesirable psycho-social 
distress which would may be perceived as “decadent individualism” if expressed in other 
ways (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1995; Lee, 1998). Therapeutic techniques used in this 
context reflect these concerns, urging patients to adjust their behavior to the demands of 
the situation in a way that draws attention away from their internal psychological state 
(Kirmayer, 2007). This literature shows that cultural variations in concepts of mind, self, 
and the person render certain characteristics more relevant than others for identifying 






The effect of understanding on perceived normality 
Given that Westerners are expected to psychologize to a greater extent than East 
Asians it is predicted that understanding is more likely to have a normalizing effect on 
behavior for Westerners than for East Asians. In the Western European cultural context it 
is predicted that understanding will make behavior seem prevalent by way of the 
perceiver simulating mental states – desires and beliefs – of the deviant individual in 
order to uncover the hidden desires and beliefs that drive their behavior. In line with the 
simulation heuristic, to the extent the perceiver finds this simulation easy they will judge 
the behavior to be common (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Given that a cluster of 
behaviors is no more or less prevalent in the general population with the addition of 
causal background information this kind of thinking constitutes a reasoning fallacy (Ahn 
et al., 2003).  
Although the link between belief-desire psychology and the perception of 
prevalence is fairly well established, the influence of psychological understanding on 
moral accountability has not been so well documented. Nevertheless there are findings 
which suggest that a deviant individual may seem morally blameless through a 
psychological framework. Research by Malle (2006) indicates that moral judgment is 
strongly linked with belief-desire psychology and perceived intentionality. Psychological 
understandings of deviant behavior in terms of underlying beliefs and desires that the 
deviant individual is not aware of may confer moral acceptability by undermining the 
view that the individual is a free agent, consciously choosing to behave in a deviant 
manner. Haslam’s (2005) theory of Folk Psychiatry builds on this notion. According to 




intentionally, that is, with subjective awareness of the reasons for their behavior and a 
perception that their behavior will bring about their intention. Haslam’s theory states that 
deviant behavior can be defined as psychologized when the opposite is true, namely, 
when the deviant individual is not aware of the reasons underlying their behavior and 
sees no causal link between their behavior and their intentions. The theory therefore 
states explicitly that the perception of moral culpability may be undermined by 
psychological explanation. 
Given that psychological understandings of deviance are not seen as prevalent in 
the East Asian context, it is predicted that understanding will have less bearing on 
whether behavior seems normal, in the sense of morally excusable or common. When it 
comes to moral judgment in this cultural context there is evidence that belief-desire 
psychology may not set the standard of morality so much as societal protection 
(Hamilton, 1992; Miller & Bersoff, 1992). Consistent with research on the socio-moral 
idiom of distress, in East Asian contexts a person may be deemed abnormal to the extent 
their behavior violates relational norms (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Given that people with 
East Asian cultural backgrounds are said to have an interdependent concept of the person, 
the extent to which behavior complies with social rules and relational norms may be more 
morally relevant than psychological qualities of the deviant individual (e.g., their 
character or their intentions).   
Although not explored in the research conducted by Meehl (1973) and Ahn et al. 
(2003), the understanding-makes-it-normal phenomenon may also extend to 
psychological stigma. If belief-desire psychology sets the standard of morality, people 




understanding. If belief-desire psychology does not set the standard of morality, 
psychological understanding should do little to rectify the stigma attached to socially 
undesirable deviant behavior. It is therefore predicted that understanding will have a 
greater ameliorative effect on stigma in the Western context. Given that increased 
understanding is often as a means of eradicating stigma, cultural differences here might 
suggest the need for culturally diverse anti-stigma strategies. 
In sum, we hypothesized that there would be differential effects of understanding 
on the perceived prevalence, moral responsibility and stigma associated with abnormal 
behavior across cultural groups. Specifically, we hypothesized that providing causal 
information (i.e., understanding) about abnormal behavior would increase perceived 
prevalence and decrease perceived moral responsibility and stigma only among Western 
participants. We also predicted that people from East Asian backgrounds would moralize 
deviance to a greater extent, mediated by their greater concern with traditional social 
values, consistent with their use of a social-moral idiom of distress.  
To examine Western European and East Asian cultural tendencies, samples of 
participants were recruited from Australia and Singapore, respectively. All Australian 
participants were of European origin and all Singaporean participants were of Chinese 
origin, as measured by place of birth, self-reported nationality, and nationality of their 
mother and father. Although these are clearly not representative samples of East Asian 
and Western European culture, Singaporeans have been shown to demonstrate more 
externally oriented, (i.e., somatic) than psychological attributions when explaining 
psychiatric abnormality (Balla, 1982), whereas Australians tend to explain mental illness 




Similar to the methodology used by Ahn and colleagues (2003), participants were 
asked to rate a vignette featuring either causal or non-causal information. In the non-
causal condition participants received a list of behaviors describing a person with a 
concluding statement explaining that the behaviors should not be seen as causally related. 
In the causal condition participants received the same descriptive list but with sentences 
linking each behavior so that a causal chain was formed. If understanding makes behavior 
seem normal, descriptions featuring causal information should be seen as more “normal” 
than descriptions that do not feature causal information.  
 Whereas participants in Ahn and colleagues’ studies were asked to rate normality 
on a single item (“how normal the person is”), the present study measured multiple 
aspects of normality. Specifically, it examined whether a description of abnormal 
behavior featuring causal information was judged to be more common and morally 
acceptable than a description of behavior that did not feature causal information.  
Abnormal behaviors were based on the diagnostic criteria of two mental disorders. 
Similar to the methodology used by Ahn et al., vignettes featuring abnormal behaviors 




 Participants were sampled from Australia and Singapore. Australian participants 
(n=51) were recruited from the University of Melbourne and Singaporean participants (of 
Chinese descent) (n=51) from the National University of Singapore. All participants were 




requirement. The mean age of participants was 21.0 years (SD = 4.95) (range =17-48 
years). Across the two samples, the gender distribution differed, with 42 males and 11 
females in the Singaporean sample and 11 males and 42 females in the Australian 
sample. In light of this, the interaction between culture and gender was explored. 
 
Measures 
 In each condition, participants received a questionnaire featuring either causal or 
non-causal behavioral descriptions. In each condition, participants received two vignettes 
in random order, one featuring internalising behaviors and the other externalizing 
behaviors.  
 Each behavioral description was based on diagnostic criteria of disorders taken 
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (i.e., Major 
Depressive Disorder in the internalizing condition and Antisocial Personality Disorder in 
the externalizing condition) (APA, 1994). In line with the methodology used by Ahn et 
al. (2003), participants in the non-causal condition received a list of behavioral features 
(e.g., “J.K. was severely abused as a child. He regularly gets drunk and is aggressive 
towards others”) with a concluding statement explaining that the features were causally 
unrelated (i.e., “These characteristics are completely separate aspects of who [this person] 
is. One characteristic does not cause another”). In the causal condition participants were 
given a vignette featuring items of behavior that were linked by a causal chain (e.g., “J.K. 
was severely abused as a child. Because of ongoing issues arising from this he regularly 




 Similar to the methodology used by Ahn et al. (2003), each disorder featured 
either a life-event stem sentence (e.g., “J.K. was severely abused as a child”) or a brain-
abnormality stem sentence (e.g., “J.K. has problem in the reticular formation”). 
Administration of vignettes featuring these two stem sentences was counterbalanced so 
that equal numbers of participants received an internal disorder with life-event stem, an 
internal disorder with brain-abnormality stem, an external disorder with a life-event stem, 
and an external disorder with a brain-abnormality stem. The order of presentation was 
counterbalanced so that equal numbers of participants received these vignettes in first or 
second place.  
 Participants were then administered a 12-item Level of Contact Report (Holmes, 
Corrigan, Williams, Cancar, & Kubiak, 1999) to measure their familiarity with the DSM 
behaviors. Given that research has repeatedly demonstrated effects of familiarity on 
attitudes towards mental disorder (Holmes et al., 1999; Jorm, 2000; Rabkin, 1981) the 
Level of Contact Report was included to rule out the effects of cultural familiarity as an 
alternative explanation for the tendency to normalize.  Items on this scale include, “I have 
observed a person like this frequently”, “I have worked with people like this”, “My 
relative is like this” and “I am like this”. Participants rated items on a 7-point scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
 In order to measure how common the behavior was perceived to be, participants 
were asked, “In the general population, how many people out of 1000 do you believe are 
like this?” In order to measure perceived moral acceptability, participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which they held the person responsible for their behavior on a scale 




measured using a scale developed by Taylor and Dear (1981). It includes subscales 
assessing desire for social distance (the extent to which social contact with sufferers is 
seen as desirable), authoritarianism (the extent to which harsh, punitive measures 
towards the mentally ill are seen as warranted), benevolence (the extent to which the 
mentally ill are seen as worthy of care), and social restrictiveness (the extent to which 
sufferers are seen as integrated members of the community). Participants rated items on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 Finally, traditional social values were measured using the Traditionalism subscale 
from Schwartz’s Values Circumplex (1992). Participants were provided with a list of 
values and asked to rate the extent to which each represented a guiding principle in their 
lives. These values were “social order” (stability of society), “respect for tradition” 
(preservation of time-honoured customs), “self-discipline” (self-restraint, resistance to 
temptation), “moderate” (avoiding of extremes of feeling or action), and “obedient” 
(dutiful, meeting obligations). Each value was rated on a scale from 7 (Of supreme 
importance) to -1 (Opposed to my values). 
  
 Results 
Preliminary analyses indicated that all scales had acceptable reliability 
(Familiarity: α = 0.83; Traditionalism: α = 0.83; Social Distance: α = 0.80-0.84; Social 








 Preliminary analyses revealed that prevalence was not normally distributed. 
Therefore a log linear transformation was applied. Before testing the predicted culture  
causal manipulation interaction, a series of mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted in 
order to rule out the effects of familiarity, gender, order (Internalizing/ Externalizing and 
Externalizing/ Internalizing First) and stem (Life-event and Brain-abnormality) on 
prevalence ratings. The results show effects of gender, Λ = 0.94, F(2, 98)  = 3.13,  
p = 0.04, η2 = 0.03, and order, Λ = 0.80, F(2, 98) = 12.17, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.17, but no 
effects of stem, Λ = 0.99, F(2, 98) = 0.37, p = 0.69, η2 < 0.01, and familiarity, Λ = 0.43, 
F(2, 98)  = 1.39, p = 0.12, η2 = 0.01, on prevalence ratings. In light of these findings, 
gender and order were included in the mixed-design ANOVA testing the predicted 
interaction between culture and the causal manipulation.  
A 2 (Culture: Australian and Singaporean)  2 (Cause: causal vs. non-causal 
manipulation) × 2 (Condition: internalizing vs. externalizing)  2 (Gender: male vs. 
female) × 2 order (Internalizing first vs. second) mixed-design ANOVA was then 
conducted on prevalence ratings. Most importantly, the predicted interaction between 
culture and the causal manipulation was found, Λ = 0.93, F(2, 84) = 3.08, p = 0.05, η2 =      
0.05. There were additional effects that did not affect our interpretation of the culture x 
causal manipulation interaction. There was a significant effect of order, Λ = 0.84, F(2, 
84) = 8.08, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.15, where people who received the internalizing disorder first 
(M = 1.78) rated the behavior as more prevalent than people who received the 
externalizing disorder first (M = 1.61), and an interaction between order and the causal 




condition gave higher prevalence ratings when they received the internalizing disorder 
first (M = 1.75) than people who received the externalizing disorder first (M = 1.46). 
In order to provide greater insights into the culture  causal manipulation 
interaction effect, separate analyses were conducted for internalizing and externalizing 
conditions. They also showed significant culture  causal manipulation interactions in 
both the internalizing, F(1, 84)  = 5.95, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.08, and externalizing, F(1, 84)  = 
3.75, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.03, conditions (see Table 1). In the internalizing condition, 
Australians who received the causal information rated the behavior to be more prevalent 
than those who did not, t(49) = 1.88, p = 0.05, d = 0.54 . By contrast, Singaporeans who 
received causal information rated the behavior to be less prevalent than those who did not 
receive causal information, t(49) = 2.39, p = 0.02, d = 0.68. In the externalizing 
condition, Australians who received the causal information rated the behavior to be 
marginally more prevalent than those who did not receive the causal information, t(48) = 
1.91, p = 0.06, d = 0.55. No significant effect was found for Singaporeans in the 
externalizing condition, t(49) = 1.33, p = 0.19, d = 0.38. 
 
Moral responsibility  
 As with the analysis of prevalence ratings, a series of mixed-design ANOVAs 
were conducted in order to rule out the effects of familiarity, gender, order, and stem on 
moral responsibility. Again, in line with the hypotheses, there was an interaction between 
culture and cause,  = 0.98, F (1, 96) = 3.88, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.04 (see Table 1). There 
were additional effects that did not influence our interpretation of the above interaction 




whereby people displaying externalizing behaviors (M = 68.99) were held morally 
responsible to a greater extent than people displaying internalizing behaviors (M = 
55.99). An interaction between condition and culture was found,  = 0.91, F (1, 96) = 
3.88, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.04, indicating that Singaporeans (M = 128.85) held the person 
morally responsible to a greater extent than Australians (M = 104.79) in the externalizing 
condition, t(100) = 1.99, p = 0.04, d = 0.40. There was no interaction between culture and 
gender,  = 0.99, F(1, 92) = 0.08, p = 0.78, η2 < 0.01. 
 Again, to shed further light on the culture  causal manipulation interaction effect, 
separate analyses were conducted and showed significant interactions in the internalizing, 
F(1, 96) = 4.76, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.05, and externalizing, F (1, 96) = 3.86, p = 0.05, η2 = 
0.03, conditions. In the internalizing condition, Australians who received the causal 
information rated the person to be less morally responsible than those who did not receive 
the causal information, t(48) = 2.48, p = 0.01, d = 0.72 but there was no difference for the 
Singaporeans, t(48) = 0.39, p = 0.69, d = 0.11. In the externalizing condition, Australians 
who received the causal information rated the person to be less morally responsible than 
those who did not receive the causal information, t(49) = 2.06, p = 0.04,  d = 0.59, but 
again the Singaporeans did not, t(49) = 0.38, p = 0.97, d = 0.11. 
 
Stigma  
There were four stigma scales used in each condition (Internalizing and 
Externalizing). A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with the four stigma measures 
as repeated measures with condition (Internalizing and Externalizing) as a within-subjects 




effects of familiarity, gender, order (Internalizing first or second) and stem (Life-event 
and Brain-abnormality) on stigma. Results of these analyses showed a multivariate effect 
of gender (Λ = 0.83, F(3, 98)  = 6.73, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.20). No significant effects were 
found for order (Λ = 0.99, F(3, 98)  = 0.33, p = 0.80, η2 < 0.01), familiarity (Λ = 0.14, 
F(3, 98)  = 0.94, p = 0.65, η2 = 0.01), or stem (Λ = 0.95, F (3, 98) = 1.72, p = 0.17, 
η2 = 0.05). Given these results, gender and order were then included in testing the 
predicted interaction between culture and the causal manipulation.  
A 2 (Culture: Australian vs. Singaporean)  2 (Cause: causal vs. non-causal 
manipulation) × 2 (Gender: male vs. female) x 2 (Condition: internalizing vs. 
externalizing) x 4 (Stigma: four subscales) ANOVA was conducted on the stigma 
measures. Examination of the results shows a multivariate effect of stigma (Λ = 0.18,  
F(3, 92)  = 38.76, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.81), an interaction between stigma and gender  (Λ = 
0.44, F(3, 92)  = 2.61, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.04), and an interaction between stigma and culture 
(Λ = 0.89, F(3, 92 = 3.62, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.23). However there was a very large between-
subjects effect of culture, F(1, 94)  = 12.04, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.50, showing that 
Singaporeans (M = 3.38) stigmatize to a greater extent than Australians (M = 2.69). Post-
hoc t-tests showed that Singaporeans scored higher on every stigma scale except Social 
Distance (see Table 2). There was no interaction between culture and cause (Λ = 0.96, 
F(3, 85)  = 1.26, p = 0.29, η2 = 0.02). 
 
Traditionalism 
Finally, an independent-samples t-test was conducted on the traditionalism subscale of 




6.92) were more likely to endorse traditional social values than Australians (M = 5.89), 
t(100) = 3.68, p < 0.01, d = 0.74). A mediation analysis was conducted to examine 
whether endorsement of traditional social values explains the Singaporean tendency to 
moralize. Results of this analysis indicate partial mediation (Sobel Z = 2.31, p = 0.02) 
(see Figure 1), with the effect of culture on moralizing remaining significant after the 
addition of traditionalism.  
Discussion 
 
 The central predictions of the current study were supported. Australians perceived 
abnormal behavior to be more common and morally acceptable in the causal condition, 
where the behavior was made more understandable, but Singaporeans did not. Despite 
research by Ahn and colleagues (2003) showing that behavior with a life-event first cause 
is judged to be more normal than behavior with a brain abnormality first cause, the 
present study shows no difference between life-event and brain abnormality first causes 
on perceptions of abnormality. For example, brain abnormality explanations were not 
associated with greater stigma than life-event explanations, contrary to some previous 
findings (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). In addition, abnormality judgments 
were not influenced by familiarity with mental illness.   
  Although a further study is necessary in order to establish that it is in fact 
psychologizing which underlies the normalization effect, the current study provides some 
support for this idea. In the causal condition, each manipulation featured a behavioral 
explanation of a type that Malle (1999) terms “causal history of reasons”. Explanations of 




According to Haslam’s theory of Folk Psychiatry (2005), these explanations are 
psychological when used to explain psychiatric phenomenon. Given that psychological 
explanations led only Australians to perceive abnormal behavior as common and morally 
acceptable, it would seem that psychological explanations do not have a normalizing 
effect for Singaporeans. 
For Singaporeans, the causal manipulation not only failed to have a normalizing 
effect on ratings of moral acceptability it, but made Internalizing behavior seem less 
prevalent. Although this finding was not predicted, it can be explained by research on 
cultural differences in the symptom presentation of depression (Kleinman & Good, 1985; 
Ryder at al., 2008). According to this research, people from Chinese cultures tend to 
emphasize somatic (i.e., bodily complaints) rather than psychological (e.g., feelings of 
hopelessness) symptoms of depression. Given that vignettes in the causal condition were 
constructed using psychological language, this type of symptom presentation may have 
been seen as unusual for Chinese-Singaporeans.  
Significant effects of order were also found for judgments of prevalence such that 
participants who rated Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) first gave higher prevalence 
ratings than participants who rated it second. Given that Anti-Social Personality Disorder 
is a more severe disorder than MDD, participants who rated Anti-Social PD first may 
have been primed to read the vignettes through a more pathological lens than participants 
who rated MDD first.    
In terms of stigma, Singaporeans expressed fewer benevolent attitudes more 
desire for social distance (in the externalizing condition only), and endorsed more 




traditional social values and, in line with the hypothesis, cultural differences in moral 
responsibility were mediated by such values. These findings support research in cultural 
psychiatry showing that, in this cultural context, abnormal behavior is judged according 
to social or moral criteria, whereby the behavior itself and its social impact are of 
principal relevance. As a consequence, behavior which violates rules, conventions, and 
social mores may be seen as uncommon and unacceptable, morally, regardless of its 
psychological comprehensibility.  
Although the findings lend themselves to an interpretation such as this, further 
research is needed to examine whether it is social values rather than mental state 
imputation (i.e., intention or lack thereof) that is driving judgments of abnormality in the 
Singaporean context. Previous research shows that severe mental illness is less 
stigmatized in developing (and often collectivist) countries when people remain a 
contributing member of the community (Cooper & Sartorius, 1977). It may be that there 
is a similar phenomenon present in the Singaporean or East Asian context. By way of 
examining this, a future study could present participants with vignettes where the social 
ramifications of the behavior are manipulated. Manipulated information might include 
holding down a job, maintaining relationships and being of service to the community.  
  Building on the present study, it would be interesting to examine the extent to 
which specific content of the current vignettes produced abnormality judgments. In the 
externalizing condition there are of course many references to anti-social behavior (i.e., 
“he is aggressive towards others”) and in the internalizing condition there is reference to 
behavior which fails to comply with social expectation (i.e., “he has stopped going to 




disruptive behavior, future research should examine whether references such as these 
underlie abnormality judgments in the Singaporean context. 
Another issue for future research is to address the limitations of the current 
study’s sample. Given that our central prediction relates to psychologizing tendencies, it 
is clearly not ideal to have a sample of participants taken from undergraduate psychology 
courses. Despite the fact that academic training cannot account for cultural differences in 
psychologizing tendencies as all participants had received similar levels of psychological 
training, future studies should nevertheless aim to replicate the current study’s findings 
with people who have no background in the study of psychology. Future studies should 
also aim to have a more even gender distribution across cultural groups and extend the 
range of cultural groups explored beyond Australia and Singapore. 
Finally, future research could improve upon the vignette methodology used in the 
current study. Presenting participants with de-contextualized descriptions of strangers 
may not reflect the real-life situation of encountering a person with a mental disorder. 
The unrealistic nature of the task may influence judgments of prevalence in particular, 
such that ratings in the non-causal condition may reflect the unlikelihood of a person 
having a list of symptoms which are in no way causally related. Although this does not 
explain the cultural differences found, future studies would no doubt benefit from the 
scenarios being as realistic as possible. In addition to this, it may be possible to move 
beyond the vignette methodology and explore the understanding-makes-it-normal effect 
through techniques involving psychological simulation (i.e., asking people to imagine 
possible explanations for behavior) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Sherman, Zhner, 




 Overall, the current study demonstrates cultural differences in the effect of 
understanding on judgments of normality. In the Western cultural context, abnormality 
may be equated with irrational psychological functioning. If deviance is equated with 
irrationality, understanding can make a disorder seem normal by bringing a sense of order 
back to disorder or, put another way, by making the irrational seem rational again. In the 
East Asian context, deviance may not be identified by irrational mental states so much as 
violations of social obligation. This being the case, the normative status of deviant 
behavior will remain unchanged by an understanding of the deviant individual’s 
underlying motives.  
Different frameworks for interpreting deviance make sense in the light of cultural 
variation in person conceptions. While a psychologizing idiom makes sense in Western 
culture where the person is conceived as a “bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe” (Geertz, 1984, p.126) it does not make sense in the 
East Asian context, where “the boundary between the person and situation is rather 
porous and ill-defined" (Choi, Nisbett & Norenzayan, 1999, p.57). The results of the 
current study suggest that cultural variations in person conceptions (i.e., conceptions of 
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Table 1  
Mean (SD) Ratings of Australians and Singaporeans on Prevalence and Moral 
Responsibility as a Function of Causal Information 
 
Dependent measure   Australians Singaporeans 
Prevalence 
 Overall 
  Causal   2.04 (0.11) 1.43 (0.08) 
  Non-causal  1.77 (0.11) 1.76 (0.11) 
 Internalizing condition 
  Causal   2.11 (0.11) 1.37 (0.11) 
  Non-causal  1.82 (0.11) 1.80 (0.11) 
 Externalizing condition 
  Causal   1.96 (0.10) 1.49 (0.04) 




  Causal   51.74 (5.13) 64.36 (4.94) 
  Non-causal  69.40 (4.98) 62.90 (5.18) 
 Internalizing condition 
  Causal   47.20 (5.55) 55.61 (5.33) 
  Non-causal  68.23 (5.33) 52.92 (5.55) 
 Externalizing condition 
  Causal   56.28 (4.72) 73.11 (4.55) 








Mean (SD) ratings of Australians and Singaporeans on Stigma Scales 
 
Stigma scale     Australians  Singaporeans 
Social Distance 
 Internalizing condition  3.79 (0.99)   4.11 (1.01) 
 Externalizing condition  2.38 (0.94)   2.78 (1.03) 
Authoritarianism 
 Internalizing condition  2.21 (0.69)  3.03 (0.83) 
 Externalizing condition  2.81 (0.97)  3.93 (1.00) 
Social Restrictiveness 
 Internalizing condition  2.16 (0.84)  2.98 (0.92) 
 Externalizing condition  3.21 (0.96)  3.89 (1.04) 
Benevolence 
 Internalizing condition  2.09 (0.88)  2.47 (0.88) 













Figure 1. Mediation analysis showing that the effect of culture on moralizing is partially 



































 = 0.45*                                        = 0.80* 
Culture             
     = 0.54* (0.45*) 
*  p < 0.05 
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